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The purpose of this essay is to exposit and interpret some of the essential 
contours of the phenomenology of Christianity proposed by Michel Henry in 
dialogue with his theological critics. These critics are numerous, but many of 
their critiques can be united under a single theme: the accusation of 
Gnosticism. One reads in them that Henry is a Gnostic monist, or rather a 
dualist, or rather both, or perhaps even a pantheist; that he blurs the 
distinction between the human being and God; that he denies or ignores the 
world or the creation; or that he denies the traditional Christian conception of 
faith in favor of a kind of quasi-mystical gnōsis; and so on. The conviction 
motivating the composition of the present work is that all such criticisms are 
ill-founded, indeed that the substance of Henry’s phenomenology of 
Christianity, such as it is formulated in his Christian “trilogy,” is not Gnostic 
at all.1 The truth is rather that Henry proposes a kind of “life-idealism” 
according to which (i) life is the foundation of the possibility of the world; (ii) 
life assumes a visible, external representation (viz., the empirical body) in its 
activities in the world; and (iii) the meaning of the world is that it is the arena 
in which life pursues the goal of its own perfection and growth.  
 The discussion will proceed as follows: first, by addressing the 
distinction between world and life; second, by formally stating Henry’s “life-
idealism”; and third, by responding to the various accusations of Gnosticism 
from Henry’s theological critics.2  
World and Life 
The most significant contribution brought by Michel Henry to twentieth 
century phenomenology is the insight that there are two distinct domains of 
appearance. This is a point he fervently maintains contrary to the “ontological 
monistic” presuppositions not only of Husserl and Heidegger but also of 
much of the Western philosophical tradition in general, which only 
recognized one mode of appearance—that of the object in the world.3 In good 
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phenomenological manner, this is a proposal which can be confirmed by 
every person through careful reflection upon his or her own experience. On 
the one hand, there is the domain of the “world,” this vast “Outside” in which 
objects show themselves as other before the gaze of intentional consciousness 
in the form of irreal representations subject to the constant flow of the 
Heraclitean flux of time. In this itself-apparent stage or horizon or 
environment or milieu of visibility appear objects of all kinds, not only actual 
concrete objects such as this cat or that dog, but even abstract or ideal objects, 
such as the truths of mathematics and geometry.4 Thus, the mode of 
appearance of objects is “worldly.” On the other hand, there is the domain of 
“life,” in which a living subjectivity characterized by its own proper ipseity 
constantly experiences itself in various modes, whether suffering or joy or 
whatever. In the world, there appears an object, such as an empirical body with 
its numerous visible properties—for example, masculine, tall, somewhat 
muscular, somewhat fat, with a mustache, of a certain weight, of a certain 
shape, of a certain determinable age, of a certain ethnic ancestry, possessing a 
particular chemical constitution, and so on. But the life of this man which is 
being described—more specifically, that subjective experience that he has of 
himself as a living being, indeed which he himself is—strictly speaking is not 
itself worldly, nor is it directly perceptible in the world, since it appears only 
to him. 
 World and life are thus two distinct domains of appearance, each with 
its proper mode of manifestation. The appearance of the world is 
characterized by intentional ekstasis, whereas that of life can be described as 
enstatic and nonintentional. In the world are found objects, whereas in life 
oneself is found. Now, Henry makes a further contribution to the 
phenomenological tradition when he argues, contrary to what would seem to 
be a natural objectivistic tendency, that life is in fact more foundational than 
the world. Henry’s argument in Material Phenomenology is as follows: 
Life is thus not a something, like the object of biology, but 
the principle of every thing. It is a phenomenological life in 
the radical sense where life defines the essence of pure 
phenomenality and accordingly of being insofar as being is 
coextensive with the phenomenon and founded on it. For 
what could I know about a being that could not appear? 
Because life is the original phenomenalization at the core of 
being and thus what makes it be, one must reverse the 
traditional hierarchy that subordinates life to being under 
the pretext that it would be necessary for life itself “to be.” 
As such, the living would delineate only a region of being, 
a regional ontology. But the being to which life is submitted 
is Greek being, the being of a worldly being, which would 
be thought and conceived starting on the basis of the world. 
Such a being would still only be a dead being or rather a 
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nonbeing, if the ek-stasis in which its proper 
phenomenality unfolds were not auto-affected in the 
immediacy of the pathos of Life. So Life always founds 
what we call “being” rather than the contrary.5   
The argument can perhaps be understood thus. A thing is called a 
“being” because it appears within the horizon of the “Outside” of the world, 
i.e., because it fulfills an intention. But nothing could appear, and thus nothing 
could be a being, unless something could feel itself being appeared to. And to 
feel oneself being appeared-to is nothing other than to possess life, i.e., to 
experience oneself constantly.6 In this way, the world is defined with reference to 
life, whereas life is defined with reference to itself. As Karl Hefty comments, “There 
can ‘be’ things, real things imbued with real meaning, the world in all its 
wondrous diversity, only in life.”7  
A similar argument is also found in this passage from Incarnation: 
Every sensed body presupposes another body that senses 
it; every body that is seen presupposes a power of vision 
and the implementation, operation, or, as we would say, 
performance of this power. . . . So we are inevitably referred 
from a sensible, worldly body, which is an object of the 
world, to a body of another order entirely: a transcendental 
body endowed with the fundamental powers of seeing, 
sensing, touching, hearing, moving, and being moved—
and defined by these power. . . . A subjective, 
transcendental body, giving and sensing the body given 
and sensed by it—every worldly, objective body.8  
Once more the argument is rather clear. The seen empirical body 
presupposes a body which possesses the power of sight. But it is obvious that 
the operation of the power of sight is not itself seen. “Who has ever seen his 
own vision?”9 This is to say that the ekstatic intentionality involved in the 
seeing of a visible object presupposes the enstatic nonintentionality of self-
affection, or as Michael Kelly puts it: “intentionality presupposes self-
awareness.”10 The transcendence and ekstasis associated with the world is 
thus founded upon immanence.  
Now, if the world is founded upon life, there is also the question of the 
origin of the transcendental living self which each person is and to whom the 
world and its objects appear. Henry’s argumentation on this point is very 
clear and, in many ways, reminiscent of classical theistic natural theology,11 
despite his own criticisms of and opposition to the natural theological project 
in general.12  
The most fundamental truth about any person is that he or she is a living 
self, whose life consists in the fact of his or her constantly experiencing herself 
as alive. Life is the fundamental ontological condition for Michel Henry. Now, 
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he writes: “The most remarkable characteristic of our entire practical life is to 
act in every circumstance with such ease, in a freedom so great that it pays no 
attention to the transcendental condition of the numerous actions it constantly 
accomplishes spontaneously.”13  Because of this ease, the transcendental self 
“deems itself finally to be the source and foundation of its very being. Thus 
the greatest illusion of all: this I, insuperably passive toward itself, always 
already given to itself in life, placed in it independently of its own willing, has 
become in its own eyes an all-powerful Subject, master of itself, as it were 
absolute principle of its condition living, of its self, of all its capacities and its 
talents.”14 But it is at the same time obvious that no living human being is 
responsible for the fact of his or her being alive, but rather finds him- or herself 
always already having received life and thus his or her very self as a gift.15 No 
one could  do anything to secure for him- or herself even a moment’s life more, 
since every action a human being could perform would require the prior 
possession of life. Thus, “This powerlessness of humans, even within the 
actual exercise of their ‘I can,’ signifies their condition of sonship—the fact 
that each of their powers, that their self, that their lives are only given to 
themselves in the self-givenness of absolute Life.”16 In this way, as Henry says 
in Words of Christ, there is a distinction and separation to be made between 
the finite living self and the absolute Life of God which is immanently present 
in each finite living self as that life which makes him or her to be alive.17 The 
human being is therefore alive because of God who is absolute Life. The 
human being is engendered in the absolute Life of God. 
 For Henry, this fact about the human being as a son of God engendered 
within the absolute Life of God is the fundamental teaching of Christianity. 
This also means further that the truth of Christianity is not a supernaturally 
revealed truth that would otherwise be inaccessible to reason.18 Rather, it is a 
truth about phenomenality and is thus immanently knowable:  
Christ says to humans: you are the sons of God. “you have 
only one Father.” Where is the referent of this assertion? In 
us. We are sons of God. God is Life and we are living beings. 
Are there living beings somewhere who do not carry life in 
themselves, who would not be carried by it? This is not a 
philosophical and speculative thesis. We feel and experience 
life in us as that in which we live, even when we feel and 
experience that we have not given this life to ourselves. The self-
revelation in which we are given and revealed to ourselves, 
is the Word [Parole] of Life, is its Word [Verbe]. Thus we are 
the irresistible proof of what the Word [Parole] speaks to us, 
there where it does not cease to speak our own life to us. 
Whoever hears this Word, where it speaks to us, forever 
hears the sound of his or her birth in him- or herself. It is to 
us that the Word says: “Today, I have engendered you” 
[Heb. 1:5].19  
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So also, in I Am the Truth Henry writes that the truth of Christianity “concerns 
not what shows itself but the fact of self-showing, not what appears but the 
way of its appearing, not what is manifest but the pure manifestation, in itself 
and as such—or, to put it another way, not the phenomenon but 
phenomenality.”20 And this in turn implies that the human being is not 
ignorant of God: 
Yet, if God is Life . . . we know what God is. We know it not 
via our thinking, according to the shaky reasons of an 
understanding which undertakes to reflect on God without 
knowing why and, trying to grasp some aspect of him, sees 
precisely nothing. We know it because we are living beings and 
because living beings are only living if they carry Life in 
themselves not as a secret unknown to them but as that itself 
which they experience without cease, as that in which they 
experience themselves, as their own essence and their very reality. 
If God is Life, then, as Meister Eckhart will say, the human 
being—this living being in the life which we each are—is “a 
human who knows God” (ein Gott wissender mensch).21 
In this way, one can know what God is—indeed, even know Him.22, 23 For 
Henry, then, the essential teaching of Christianity is eminently knowable. One 
could even say that it is known by all in principle, although very many, living 
under the illusion of the self-sufficiency of the “I Can,” forget their condition 
as sons of God.24  
Life-Idealism 
In the arguments enumerated above, namely from Material 
Phenomenology and Incarnation, it would seem that Henry is able to establish 
the fundamentality of life relative to the world by delimiting the definition of 
the world to the fact of appearing. Otherwise, one could easily retort that the 
existence of the world or at least of the things which show themselves within 
it is independent of the fact of their appearing, so that the proposed 
subordination of world to life fails.25 In this sense, Henry proposes what might 
be called a kind of life-idealism.  
It would be useful to clarify the meaning of this label. Henry’s philosophy 
is here called an idealism because it grants ontological priority to 
consciousness and subjectivity rather than to unconscious material reality (à 
la Berkey’s idealism); and it is a life-idealism because this ontologically prior 
consciousness is understood not merely as (possibly impersonal, subject-less) 
thought but as flesh, i.e., as a living self or transcendental body that constantly 
experiences itself in a diversity of modes. This is what is meant by the term 
life-idealism. 
There are three fundamental theses of Henry’s life-idealism:  
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(i) life is the foundation of the possibility of the world,  
(ii) life assumes a visible, external representation (viz., the 
empirical body) in its activities in the world, and  
(iii) the meaning of the world is that it is the arena in which life 
pursues the goal of its own perfection and growth.  
Once these points are appreciated, it will become evident that Henry’s 
thought is not Gnostic. The goal of this section is to explain each point in turn.  
Notably, Jean-François Lavigne also thinks of Henry as something of an 
idealist. But he supposes that such arguments proposed by Henry as were 
offered above would seem to commit him to subjective idealism. Yet Lavigne 
insists that such a thing “certainly was not [his] intention.”26 He thinks Henry 
was not trying to be an idealist because he “seems to acknowledge the 
independent existence of real material bodies in the world.”27 To give one 
example, Henry says just a little bit after the passage cited above from 
Incarnation: “As soon as the body shows itself to us in the world, it owes to 
that mode of appearing certain phenomenological characteristics, all of which 
derive from exteriority—but never its existence. So one must recognize that all 
the bodies that are uncovered in the world (whether it is an issue of our own 
body or any body at all) exist before this uncovering and independently of it.”28 
And yet this would seem to be contrary to the assertion cited above according 
to which “life is the original phenomenalization at the core of being and thus 
what makes it be.”29 Is there consequently a contradiction in Henry’s thought 
on this matter?  
The question is that of reconciling Henry’s idealistic argumentation 
which founds the world on life, on the one hand, and his admission of the 
independent existence of bodies apart from their appearing within the world, 
on the other. This contradiction can be removed if one assumes a particular 
relation between the world and life, namely: what appears in the world is a 
representation or external “visible” aspect of an invisible interior life. This would be 
yet a further sense in which the world is founded upon life. Not only is life 
the prior condition of the appearance of the world in general, but what 
appears in the world is precisely an external, visible representation of the 
invisible reality of life itself; the empirical or visible body is a representation 
of the transcendental or invisible body or flesh. And insofar as each living self 
is not brought about in the world but rather by being engendered immanently 
in the absolute Life of God, it follows that each living self—or more precisely, 
each “transcendental subjective body”30 and “invisible, originary 
corporeity”31—exists prior to its appearing in the world. Thus, when Henry 
says,  
As soon as the body shows itself to us in the world, it owes 
to that mode of appearing certain phenomenological 
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characteristics, all of which derive from exteriority—but 
never its existence.32 
he is referring to the transcendental subjective body or flesh which shows 
itself in the world by means of projecting a representation that is subject to the 
phenomenological characteristics of world-appearance. This body, the one 
that stands behind the appearance by which it is represented, does not owe 
its existence to exteriority, because it is in fact a living self which comes into 
life as a result of being engendered in the absolute Life of God. It is also worth 
noting that when Henry says, 
So one must recognize that all the bodies that are uncovered 
in the world (whether it is an issue of our own or any body 
at all) exist before this uncovering and independently of it. 
it is ambiguous whether he refers to any material body whatsoever or only to 
human or living bodies. If one interprets him as referring to any material body 
whatsoever, and if one accepts the proposal above that the body which 
appears in the world is the external, visible representation of the living self, 
then it would follow that there is a living self for each body encountered in 
the world—a kind of panpsychism. This would be contrary to the various 
statements Henry makes to the effect that any number of objects in the world 
cannot feel or experience anything. It might therefore seem preferable to 
interpret him to be referring to living human bodies, whether “our own” 
(pluralis majestatis) or else “any body at all” of some other living being.  
 There is still a further possibility, although it is admittedly speculative 
and goes beyond what Henry explicitly says. It should be understood rather 
a proposal for the development of Henry’s system. Just as the empirical human 
body is a visible, external representation of the transcendental living self that 
every human being truly is, it would also be open to Henry to suppose that 
the world itself—not the Earth or the physical cosmos, but this entire itself-
apparent milieu of visibility in which individual things appear—is the visible, 
external “outside” of the absolute Life of God. This would be a further way in 
which the world and the objects within it could exist apart from and prior to 
their becoming visible to any particular finite transcendental self. Their 
existence apart from their being unveiled to the consciousness of any 
particular finite ego would be the visible aspect of the independence of 
absolute Life relative to all finite lives which depend on it. Thus, Henry says 
that “the worldly body is possible only once we have presupposed a flesh 
already revealed to itself as living flesh in the pathos-filled self-revelation of 
life.”33 Interpreting the world as God’s “body” would thus constitute a 
different sense in which Life can be “the principle of every thing.”34  Not only 
is life the precondition of appearing of the world, but the world itself, as the 
absolute horizon of all visibility, is the visible external “aspect” of the absolute 
Life of God. This would not mean that God could be identified with any 
particular thing in the world, just as for Henry the true human self is not 
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anything that appears in the world. But it would explain how it is that things 
which do not possess their own individual life might still exist apart from 
their appearance in the world: they are parts of the visible, external “aspect” 
of God. Such an interpretation or development of Henry’s thought would also 
provide the world with greater theological significance. One could visualize 
the idea as follows:  
finite living self visible objective body 
absolute Life of God world as milieu of visibility 
The visible would thus be a mirror of the invisible. For example, the 
visible body would be in the world in such a way as to represent visibly, 
externally, the dwelling of the finite living self in the absolute Life of God. 
And the variegated visible dependence of the worldly body on the world and 
the other things within it—its need to eat, to drink, to seek shelter, and so on—
would be a visible representation of the dependence of the finite living being 
on absolute Life.35 
Whatever one says about this more speculative proposal, it is 
nevertheless clear how to remove the contradiction identified by Lavigne. The 
empirical body which appears in the world in fact the external, visible 
representation of the invisible living body, the existence of this latter body 
being independent of and prior to its being unveiled in the world to any other 
person in particular. This introduces the second thesis of Henry’s “life-
idealism,” which is also worth considering some detail. 
Henry says that the visible is the representation of the invisible in 
numerous places. Consider the following passage, which is worth quoting in 
full: 
Our objective worldly body is animated by significations 
that make it precisely this living body (Leibkörper) whose 
eyes are eyes that see, whose ears are ears that hear, whose 
members are movable members moving freely by 
themselves—all significations borrowed from our original 
flesh, in whose reality alone the operations aimed at 
through these various significations draw their reality. 
Such a body is indeed seen in the world, and the 
significations that confer it the character of being living are 
aimed at it too, yet as unreal noematic correlates. But the 
reality to which they refer—that of our living flesh with all 
these real operations (of seeing, moving, etc.)—this reality 
belongs to the sphere of transcendental life’s absolute 
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immanence; and like it, this is invisible. . . . As for me, while 
I perceive my own body in the world, I am this hidden flesh, 
which is sensing, moving, and suffering, and which 
endows my objective body with the characteristics it has for 
me as well as for others.36  
The empirical body which is visible in the world is a representation of the 
invisible living self, a representation which is in certain ways adequate and 
suggestive, even if the life which is represented by the body never itself 
becomes visible. Thus, one sees a body with eyes, ears, a nose, hands, and so 
on, understanding this to be a living body belonging to a self that enjoys life. 
One could even say that the outside corresponds with the inside, as the invisible 
felt sadness is outwardly projected in the form of a saddened countenance. 
This is what Henry refers to as the “duplicity of appearing,” as for example 
when commenting on the spirit-body unity as a source of anxiety in 
Kierkegaard.37 And finally, in I Am the Truth: “Any visible appearance is 
paired with an invisible reality.”38 These passages support the interpretation 
according to which, for Henry, the body which shows itself in the world in an 
external, visible representation of the invisible living self which is engendered 
in the absolute Life of God prior to all appearing in the world. 
 Recognizing this point makes it possible to address two notorious and 
controversial dimensions of Henry’s thought. On the one hand, there is the 
largely negative and catastrophic language that Henry uses to describe the 
mode of appearance of the world and the things which appear within it. 
Henry writes that what appears in the world is only “an image, a 
representation, an ob-ject, something opposite us, a phenomenon.”39 The 
thing which appears self-externalizes and projects an image of itself. At the 
same time, this self-externalization takes place in accordance with the 
ineluctable flow of time, so that there is no frozen present moment of absolute 
presence but only a ceaseless flow of profiles and aspects.40 For this reason, 
“this coming-into-appearance in the ‘outside-itself’ of the world signifies that 
it is the thing itself that finds itself cast outside itself. It is fractured, broken, 
cleaved in two, stripped of its own reality—in such a way that, now deprived 
of that reality that was its own, emptied of its flesh, it is no longer outside 
itself, in the world’s Image, but just its own skin, a simple image, in effect, a 
transparent film, a surface without thickness, a piece of naked externality 
offered to a gaze that slides over it without being able to penetrate into it or 
reach anything but empty appearance.”41 As a result, he says that time and 
the world “destroy” and “derealize” the things that appear within them. In 
the world, in that “outside” into which a thing is flung outside of itself in the 
form of a representational appearance, there is “only, on all sides, death.”42  
This problem dissolves if one holds onto the interpretive proposal being 
made here, according to which what appears in the outside must be 
understood as a representation of what exists in life. It is only if one rejects 
this and limits oneself purely to the world and to its peculiar mode of 
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appearing that the nihilism and destruction which Henry mentions follow 
ineluctably. For Henry, the world is not a site of death and annihilation tout 
court, but rather the world understood in itself, apart from life. This is in fact 
what he says: “If everything appeared to us in this way—if there existed no other 
truth than that of the world—there would be no reality at all anywhere but only, 
on all sides, death.”43 
On the other hand, there is the insistently repeated affirmation that life 
does not appear within the world at all but only in its own domain. Henry 
insists that “Life designates a pure manifestation, always irreducible to that 
of the world, an original revelation that is not the revelation of an other thing, 
and does not depend on anything other, but is rather a revelation of self, that 
absolute self-revelation that is Life itself.”44 Life is the domain of pure self-
revelation, since, “Life is nothing other than that which reveals itself—not 
something that might have been an added property of self-revealing, but the 
very fact of self-revealing, self-revelation as such.”45 Insofar as the world is 
the domain in which objects are revealed as being other than the intentional 
gaze of transcendental consciousness which sees them, it follows that “Living 
is not possible in the world.”46 Life does not reveal by casting an object outside 
of itself in the form of a publicly visible representation. Rather, what life 
reveals is itself, so that the person who is alive precisely as alive experiences 
him- or herself. As a result, “Life does not cast outside itself what it reveals 
but holds it inside itself, retains it in so close an embrace that what it holds 
and reveals is itself.”47 This means that life does not appear within the world: 
“in the world and in the externality of its ‘outside,’ no ‘Living’ is possible—
and consequently no livings either.”48  
At the same time, although life does not appear in the world, nevertheless 
the living being does express itself in the world and pursue its goals there, 
even while its life as such never becomes directly perceptible. This is implied 
by Henry when he says that “we see living beings but never their life.”49 To 
say that one sees living beings is to make the visible being a representation of 
the invisible life, identifying the one with the other. Moreover, the attribution 
of life to certain beings which appear in the world is founded upon the 
experience of life in oneself, not on the detection of some visible properties or 
qualities by which certain objective bodies might distinguish themselves from 
others which appear in the world.50 One attributes to this worldly body an 
invisible flesh in virtue of which it is truly alive and manifests itself in the 
world in the precise way that it does. Elsewhere he says, as was cited above, 
that “this relation of flesh to the body is intelligible only starting from flesh 
and not starting from the body. . . . Contrary to traditional interpretations, 
which here include those of contemporary phenomenology, the worldly body 
is possible only once we have presupposed a flesh already revealed to itself 
as living flesh in the pathos-filled self-revelation of life.”51 And elsewhere: 
“Our body offers us the crucial experience in which the duality of appearing 
is decisively confirmed. This alone allows us to understand how the body 
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truly is a double reality, manifesting itself on the outside, in the outside itself 
of the world, on the one hand, and lived internally by us, on the other, in Life’s 
pathos-filled self-revelation.”52 A little further: “the objective body” is “the 
aspect in which our invisible flesh seems to appear.”53 And he also 
straightforwardly notes that the empirical body, “far from defining our actual 
body (our invisible and indivisible flesh) is only its external representation.”54 
Once more, it is clear that for Henry the visible body which appears in the 
world must be understood as belonging to and representing an invisible life. 
The life to which this body belongs is invisible and imperceptible, but it is 
nonetheless there. That is why Henry says, “For me, it is true, this ‘I can’ and 
this flesh [which are attributed to some worldly body] are only unreal 
significations, differentiating his objective body from an ordinary body 
[lacking life]. This does not alter the fact that this ‘I am,’ this flesh, and this 
originary Life are really in him. It is only because this Life really lives in him 
that these significations are ‘true,’ signifying a real life, and a real flesh—that 
his objective body is and can be, for him as for me, a ‘living’ body.”55 
This is how Henry can be understood as proposing a form of “life-
idealism.” It consists in at least the following two claims: (i) The visible world 
is founded upon life insofar as life is the prior condition of the possibility of 
the world; and (ii) each living self appears within this world through an 
external, visible representation which is the empirical body. But the question 
now arises as to the meaning of the world relative to the life which founds it, 
the subject of the third thesis. 
The understanding of the world in Henry’s phenomenology of 
Christianity is problematic for many. Joseph Rivera accuses Henry of being 
haunted by “the specter of Gnostic dualism: Life contains the truth alone and 
the world is empty.”56 He also suggests that for Henry “the world [is] without 
utility, even dangerous.”57 This does not seem true. One would think Henry 
plainly self-contradictory if he were to assert, in a book which appears in the 
world, by means of which he intends to communicate his thoughts with 
others, that there is no truth in the world. Rather, the world is only empty and 
without truth if it is understood purely in itself, apart from all reference to life. 
And the danger lies not in the world per se but in the rejection of all other truth 
except that of the world.  
More importantly, for Henry, the world is the arena in which life pursues 
its own self-actualization and perfection. He says as much in Barbarism by 
defining “culture” as  
an action that life exerts on itself and through which it 
transforms itself insofar as life is both transforming and 
transformed. “Culture” refers to the self-transformation of 
life, the movement by which it continually changes itself in 
order to arrive at higher forms of realization and 
completeness, in order to grow.58 
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Rivera is therefore mistaken to suggest that for Henry life and the world are 
polar opposites having nothing to do with another. So also, the remark of 
Kevin Hart to the effect that (in The Essence of Manifestation) “Henry condemns 
the world as the horizon of constituted phenomena, the sign of creation and 
the theatre of history” would also seem to be off the mark.59 It is not the world 
tout court which is empty of truth or dangerous or destitute or worthy of 
condemnation, but only the world taken on its own, separately from life. One 
sees; one’s seen reflection in the mirror does not see.60 Apart from life, the 
world is indeed an empty wasteland without truth. So also, to forget the truths 
of life and to plunge oneself into the pure exteriority of the world considered 
on its own—that indeed is for Henry death and nihilism. But if the world is 
put in reference to life, then it is understood subordinately as the arena in 
which living beings express themselves and pursue their purpose of self-
transformation in the pursuit of “higher forms of realization and 
completeness.” That is the true and proper meaning of the world, the third 
thesis of Henry’s “life-idealism”: the world is the arena for life’s self-
expression and self-expansion in growth.  
 The suggestion being made here is that for Henry the living self is not 
ultimately intended to fly from the world and to retreat into its own sphere of 
absolute immanence. Rather, it must live in the world—but in the right way 
and in the proper knowledge of itself as the son of God. Moreover, this 
suggestion should not be in the least surprising. Henry defines the 
transcendental body as the very condition of the possibility of the world in 
the first place.61 The flesh is endowed with a collection of senses which, 
“though their various sensations, do indeed open us to this world of bodies.”62 
The living self is endowed with distinct powers (such as the power to see or 
to taste or to move) that are constitutive of it as such and which belong to it in 
virtue of what it is, each power implying a connection to the world and being 
ordered toward expressing itself precisely in the visibility of the world.63 And 
as he says in I Am the Truth, “Any power the ego possesses is given to it in the 
very process by which it is engendered as ‘me’ in the Ipseity of the Arch-
Son.”64 The living self is thus plainly ordered toward the world ab initio insofar 
as it is constituted by various transcendental powers which make the world 
and its action within it possible. That is why it is absurd to think of the world 
as by definition devoid of all truth and utterly empty. It is only so when it is 
not seen in relation and subordinate to life, as the domain in which life is 
supposed to express itself and pursue its own self-growth and perfection. The 
world exists for and is defined in reference to life. 
Henry therefore proposes a “life-idealism” consisting in the following 
theses: (i) the foundation of the visible world on life; (ii) the manifestation of 
invisible life in the world through the form of an empirical body; (iii) the 
meaning of the world as the domain in which life pursues its own self-
actualization and perfection. 
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Accusations of Gnosticism 
Now that the contours of Henry’s life-idealism have been made explicit, 
it will be possible to respond to common objections and misconceptions 
brought forth by his theological critics. Contrary to what they say, Henry is 
neither a monist, nor a dualist, nor a pantheist, nor a world-denier, nor a faith-
rejecting proponent of a special gnōsis. 
Joseph Rivera65 and Amber Bowen,66  drawing from Emmanuel Falque,67 
accuse Henry of being a “carnal monist” in a “qualified sense” because he 
says things like this: 
In my living flesh I am given to myself and thus I am a me—
I am myself. But it is not me who has given me to myself: it 
is not me who joins me to myself. I am not the gate, the gate 
what opens me to myself, nor am I the grass, the grass that 
allows my flesh to grow. In my flesh I am given to myself, 
but I am not my own flesh. My flesh, my living flesh, is 
Christ’s.68 
But one could just as well call Thomas Aquinas an “existential monist” in a 
“qualified sense” because he affirms that every ens receives its existence (esse) 
and everything else that makes it up from God, who is tantum esse.69 The 
difference is only that for Thomas the fundamental ontological condition is 
esse, whereas for Henry it is life.70 If Thomas is not a monist, then neither must 
Henry be considered such; but if Henry is a monist in some sense, then so 
might be Thomas. In a case like this, the application of the label “monist” here 
seems to have more connotative force than actual substance.  
Bowen says that “Henry’s reading of the doctrine of creation dramatically 
illustrates the gnostic impulses throughout his signature version of 
ontological monism,” and that “In order to hold onto his philosophical 
aversions, He [sic] tailors the doctrine of creation beyond recognition.”71 
Kevin Hart, too, accuses Henry of Gnosticism for saying that the soul is 
uncreated.72 Falque suggests that on this point Henry’s work as a whole is 
negated insofar as he fails to recognize “a distance in the relation of the human 
to God . . . that is not identical to the distance of sin.”73  But when Henry denies 
that the human being is created, he means to deny that the human being is 
totally external to God in such a way that he could continue to exist apart from 
God, just as a house can exist apart from its creator.74 Now, it is true that for 
Henry there is a certain moment of “ontological overlap” or “contact” 
between the human being and the absolute Life of God.75 But Henry also 
constantly asserts a distinction between “a finite life like ours [and] the infinite 
Life which is that of God.”76  Hefty makes this same point against Falque.77 
One could thus describe Henry (but also very many a thinker, for that matter) 
just as well as a “qualified monist” and as a “qualified dualist.” Henry means 
simultaneously to assert that the human being cannot exist or enjoy life apart 
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from being continually engendered in the absolute Life of God, so that there 
is a moment of “ontological overlap,” as well as that the finite human being is 
irreducibly him- or herself, distinct from God.  
The reason why Henry asserts a moment of “ontological overlap” 
between the finite living being and the absolute Life of God is that sharp 
distinctions between things are only evident in the “outside” of the world, 
where one thing is seen here and another thing is seen over there. Life does not 
appear in the world, and the finite living being cannot be separated from God 
without disappearing altogether. In other words, the human being does not 
enjoy “existential inertia.”78 Thus, the language used to describe the 
simultaneous sameness and difference between the finite living self and the 
absolute Life of God will naturally generate certain tensions. One can disagree 
with Henry on this point, but he is not rightly called a “monist” given that he 
would agree with the following statements: the finite self is really caused by 
but not reducible to God’s self; the finite life is really received from but not 
reducible to the infinite life of God; the real ignorance of the finite living self 
is not God’s ignorance; the real sin of the finite living self is not God’s sin; and 
so on. 
Not only is Henry called a “monist,” but he is also called a “dualist.” As 
was mentioned earlier, Rivera considers that Henry is haunted by “the specter 
of Gnostic dualism: Life contains the truth alone and the world is empty,” and 
claims that for Henry “the world [is] without utility, even dangerous.”79 But 
this also is plainly not true. Once more, for Henry the world is empty and 
without truth only if it is understood purely by itself, apart from all reference 
to life. And the danger is not in the world per se but rather in the rejection of 
all other truth except that of the world. This is how one should understand 
the passage referenced by Rivera in which Henry says: “The man of the world 
is merely an optical illusion. ‘Man’ does not exist.”80 He is referring to the 
worldly, empirical, objective body understood in abstraction from all 
reference to invisible life. The man of the world, understood merely as a 
visible object, is an optical illusion because there is discernible within it no 
individuality or ipseity.81 Rather, Henry insists that “There is Ipseity only in 
life. Ipseity belongs to the essence of Life and to its phenomenality as well. It 
is born in the process of self’s phenomenalization, in the process of its pathétik 
self-affection, and as the very mode in which that self-affecting comes 
about.”82 In other words, the ipseity of a person is not an empirically 
detectable property, so that to reduce the person to the empirically detectable 
is to do away with his or her ipseity. And something similar can be said about 
the complaint of Jack Louis Pappas, who claims that for Henry “the body 
cannot ‘appear’ without being reduced to a corpse.”83 It would seem more 
accurate to say that, for Henry, only the visible body reduced to its pure 
visibility, understood apart from all reference to invisible life, cannot be 
anything but a corpse. The visible appearance (body) must be paired with an 
invisible reality (flesh, life). The truth of a person is found in the invisibility of 
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life, whereas the body that appears in the world must be understood as only 
an external, visible representation of that life and of its efforts to pursue its 
goals within the world. 
So also, Henry is sometimes called a “pantheist.” Rivera cites Jad Hatem 
who accuses Henry of “Gnostic dualism” insofar as “the invisible depths of 
the soul and God ‘are irreducible in Henry, a fact that does not save him from 
pantheism which maintains the identity of the nature of human life with 
divine life, homoousia, a fact for which Clement of Alexandria reproached the 
Gnostics.’”84 (Is the accusation of dualism or pantheism?) Rivera also objects 
that, once God and the human being are defined in terms of life, “all language 
of ‘creaturehood or ‘finitude’ or ‘human nature’ in Henry is no longer justified 
since human nature is already divine in essence.”85 But one might make an 
accusation of pantheism (or monism, or dualism, or whatever) against those 
who say that God and the human being both exist, or are personal, or rational, 
or conscious, etc.86 Indeed, one could just as well accuse Berkeley of pantheism 
for saying that God and the human being are both spirits or minds.87 The idea 
seems to be that applying one and the same category to God and to the human 
being implies pantheism. So also, for Henry, “God being Life, the human is a 
living being.”88 But if Berkeley is not a pantheist for distinguishing between 
the finite human spirit and the eternal Spirit of God, then the same can be said 
for Henry. Indeed, pantheism is avoided precisely by distinguishing between 
God as the paradigmatic possessor of the fundamental ontological condition 
and the human being as a finite participant in that condition.89 Thus, Hefty is 
correct: “These charges seem entirely misguided, because as [sic] Henry 
affirms always and everywhere only one absolute life, and ultimately also one 
living proper to [absolute] life.”90 At best, Henry could be described as 
something of a panentheist. 
To demonstrate the non-monism and non-pantheism of Henry, it suffices 
to cite the following passage from Incarnation: 
But in Christianity there is something radically original in 
relation to the other great forms of spirituality. This 
absolute unity between all living Selves, far from signifying 
or implying the dissolution of the individuality of each one, 
is on the contrary constitutive of it, in as much as each of 
them is joined to himself or herself in the phenomenological 
effectuation of Life in its Word, and generated in 
themselves as this irreducibly singular Self, irreducible to 
any other. This is one of the decisive meanings of the 
ageless utterance of Meister Eckhart: “God engenders 
himself as myself.”. . . Thus one of the great paradoxes of 
Christianity is clarified. Maintaining each one, the most 
humble, and the most insignificant, in its own irreducibly 
singular individuality, in its condition as a transcendental Self 
that is by essence this one or that one forever—far from needing 
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or being able to be overcome or abolished anywhere, this alone can 
snatch humankind from nothingness.91  
Rivera therefore seems mistaken when he writes that “Henry’s anthropology 
succumbs to a peculiar kind of theological monism: an absolute absorption of 
‘myself’ as this particular self within the universal presence of Christ, a kind 
of absolute transcendental Christology.”92 This is contrary to what Henry 
explicitly says above, in which such an absorption or dissolution is explicitly 
rejected. 
In addition to accusing him of monism, dualism, and pantheism, Rivera 
also suggests that Henry wishes to “deny the world altogether,” that his 
analysis of the world and its mode of making-apparent “can be said to 
construct the world as a kind of ‘demonic power’ that will consume and annul 
all real and imagined totalities,” and that “a kind of nihilism can be found at 
its core.”93 But then Rivera contradicts himself when he later concedes that 
“Henry does not deny or negate the world.”94 He qualifies his earlier reading 
as follows: “The world, as the stage that displays visible objects and objective 
bodies, does not disclose the essential precisely because it masks the 
essential—the world must exist in order to cover over the invisible. And in its 
veiling of the interior self, the world shows falsehood, literally acting deceitful 
about what is really the thing itself.”95 But this interpretation is exaggerated. 
The discussion above made clear that what appears in the world is for Henry 
a visible, external representation of an invisible reality. The world does not 
lie; it just does not tell the whole story. The falsehood arises only by 
privileging the visible to the exclusion of the invisible. 
 Alongside world-denial, Rivera further accuses Henry of “Gnostic 
escapism.”96 But this argument also fails. As was noted earlier, Henry’s 
conception of things if anything makes it impossible to escape from the world. 
The world is the stage on which life is visibly represented. The living 
transcendental self is naturally endowed with several powers by which it is 
ordered to the world from the beginning. Indeed, the world is the arena 
within which life pursues its self-actualization and perfection. Thus, there is 
no world-escapism in Henry. It is true that, for Henry, the true condition of 
the human being can only be appreciated when one turns away from the 
world to one’s own condition as a finite (and thus utterly dependent) living 
self.97 But this is not world-denial. It is only the consequence of Henry’s life-
idealism according to which the world must be understood with reference to 
life, rather than the other way around.  
Finally, James Hart complains that Henry’s understanding of 
Christianity turns faith into a sort of special gnōsis rather than the pistis of 
Scripture, which he understands as “the substance of things hoped for, the 
evidence of things unseen” (Heb 11:1).98 But this too does not seem correct. In 
the first place, the Epistle to the Hebrews enjoins pistis meaning faithfulness 
and perseverance in the life of a Christian, such as was exemplified by “so 
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great a cloud of witnesses” (Heb 12:1). But the Epistle to the Hebrews also 
takes for granted that “in these last days [God] has spoken to us by a Son” 
(Heb 1:1-2). It is therefore enjoining faithfulness to a truth which is not taken 
as a matter of mere faith but rather is asserted as an item of knowledge. 
Indeed, it does not make sense to be enjoined to be faithful to something that 
one does not know to be true. And in the second place, there is a long-standing 
tradition in Christian theology which sees the essence of Christian faith as a 
kind of knowledge. For example, John Calvin defines faith as “a firm and 
certain knowledge of God’s benevolence toward us, founded upon the truth of 
the freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our minds and sealed 
upon our hearts through the Holy Spirit.”99 So also Henry: “‘I believe in 
Christ’ means: ‘I am certain of the truth which is in Him.’”100 Thus, Henry is 
not discontinuous with the broader Christian tradition in understanding faith 
as a form of knowledge.  
Concluding Remarks 
This article has attempted to show that Michel Henry is not a Gnostic of 
any variety: neither a monist, nor a dualist, nor a pantheist, nor a world-
denier, nor a proponent of a special gnōsis in place of a Christian sense of 
faith. Henry’s phenomenology must rather be understood as a form of life-
idealism according to which (i) life is the foundation of the world; (ii) life 
assumes a visible, external representation (i.e., the empirical body) in its 
activities in the world; and, (iii) the meaning of the world is that it is the arena 
in which life pursues the goal of its own perfection and growth. Once it is seen 
in this light, against his theological critics, his thought can be seen not to be 
Gnostic. He is not a monist because he constantly affirms a real and 
irreducible distinction between the finite life of the finite living self and the 
absolute Life that is God. He is not a dualist because the world and life are not 
for him two utterly disparate domains of appearance. Rather, what appears 
in the world is precisely the external, visible representation of an invisible life. 
He is not a pantheist because, once more, he always distinguishes between 
God and the finite living being, even as He recognizes a certain moment of 
ontological “overlap” or “contact” between the two. At best he is a 
panentheist. And he is certainly not a world-denier since for him the living 
being is naturally endowed with various powers which essentially and 
inescapably order it to the world. Moreover, the world is precisely the arena 
within which life pursues its self-actualization and perfection. Finally, Henry 
is not a faith-denying proponent of a special gnōsis. Rather, his conception of 
faith is consonant with the understanding of faith as knowledge in the 
Reformed tradition, for example, of Calvin.  
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